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The newly released Naval Doctrine consolidates Russian maritime ambitions

Samriddhi Roy writes on the newly released Russian Naval Doctrine.

Introduction

On 31 July 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved its latest Naval Doctrine on the cob of a large-scale war with Ukraine, approved its latest Naval Doctrine. The endeavour of the maritime policy outlined in this strategic report highlights the Russian Navy’s oceanic mandate and escalating tensions with the U.S. and NATO. The previous version of the naval doctrine, which took effect post annexation of Crimea, was adopted in 2015. Russia’s maritime doctrine has been one of the sectoral blueprints whose cornerstone is the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy ever since its debut edition in 2001. However, it has now undergone amendments, de facto rendering it a document that integrates the military aspirations of the Russian Federation through shifting its weight on naval concerns.

Moscow’s naval mission is prominently dissimilar to the 2015 edition as it extenuates an enhanced Security Strategy. That accounts for the special military operation on the territory of Ukraine, the Donetsk People’s Republic, and the Lugansk People’s Republic, as well as the dramatic deterioration of Russia’s ties with the Western nations. Albeit Putin made no mention of the ongoing war with Ukraine during his speech on Navy day, the mention of Russia’s geopolitical position in the Black and Azov sea cements exceptional strategic importance. Another critical priority of the naval doctrine is the glaring focus on bettering oceanic relations with India, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia as opposed to its traditional European allies by intensifying its presence in the Indian ocean. Such an alliance is increasingly relevant due to India’s BRICS membership and rise as an emerging global economy.

Furthermore, friendship with Saudi is equally profitable at a time when Russia is probing for alternative energy alliances. Similarly, control over the Arctic secures a firm position in the Russian decree. According to the doctrine, Moscow would work to increase the capacity of its northern and Pacific fleets to preserve “strategic stability” in the Arctic and maintain its leadership position in exploring the region’s natural riches. Moreover, Russia declared that it would boost its surveillance in the Arctic, notably in the seas around Svalbard, Franz Josef Land, and Novaya Zemlya- the areas where U.S. and NATO nations often conduct joint exercises. Finally, the agreement states explicitly that the Northern Fleet will be made more combat-ready and maritime actions will be diversified and intensified.

One of the major themes of the naval doctrine is the detailed approach to Russia’s national challenges and threats. Russian scholar and commentator Ilya Kramnik explains the strategic repositioning of Russia’s presence in the World Oceans is the intent behind the decree. Interestingly, the 2015 version makes a connection between the marine potential of Russia and the interests of the government and society. Conversely, the 2022 edition does not cite maritime potential when defining national interests as the “objectively significant demands of the state and society.” In specific thus, the doctrine concentrates on containing the U.S.’s alleged oceanic dominance and the vigorous installation of Russia’s maritime might.

Prudent look at U.S. & NATO

The 55-page document signed by President Putin foretells the likely areas of conflict and how Moscow ruses to contain its joint challenge from U.S. and NATO alliances. In this context, Putin calls for a substantial augmentation of the Russian Navy in the east, emphasising, “…modern, hi-tech shipbuilding industry in the Far East designed for building large-tonnage vessels and advanced aircraft carriers for the Navy”. For this, Moscow promises to equip its warships with unprecedented weapons against NATO’s movements at the Russian borders. Moreover, months after the neutral nations Finland and Sweden joined NATO’s military alliance, Russia is rightfully worried about sharing an 800-mile border with Finland amidst its conflict with Ukraine. Notably, the Baltic sea is conspicuously absent from the list of objectives in the doctrine, even though it is an integral part of Russian maritime security, a target for greater NATO activities, and a significant conduit for the shipment of Russian commodities. Perhaps one may assume that this symbolises NATO’s complete dominance in the North Atlantic waters, and Russia fully recognises the power play involved. Additionally, the doctrine identifies deficiencies that jeopardise Russia’s maritime capabilities (especially in the Northern Sea Route), such as the paucity of Russian naval bases abroad and the limited proportion of the Russian merchant fleet used for international trade.

The doctrine’s key addressees are the United States and its most influential allies, with the ability to alter the situation in the world ocean. Thus, the doctrine’s clause on territorial claims refers to Japan’s disagreement with Russia about ownership of the Kuril Islands. Furthermore, the Russian news agency, Tass reported Putin’s sure bet on Russian-produced Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missiles, which he believes can defeat any enemy in the world. It is, therefore, interesting to note American strategist Samuel Bendett commenting on Putin’s claims to massive maritime recourses as “questionable” and overambitious concerning the U.S. fleet. Analysts point out that the U.S. blue fleet, which incorporates 11 aircraft carriers and 92 cruisers and destroyers, among other ships, is superior to Russia’s force, which primarily comprises smaller vessels. However, security strategists also vouch for small but efficient nuclear submarines that could threaten the U.S. to a great extent. Hence, it may be argued that the Russian doctrine, if not entirely to dominate the seas, may stand to diminish U.S.’s maritime influence.

In an interview with Al Jazeera, a former spokesperson for Vladimir Putin, Mr Sergey Markov, in an interview with Al Jazeera, described the Russian Naval Doctrine as the “new reality”. Undoubtedly, the doctrine aims to strengthen Russia’s naval fleets in light of the changing global and diplomatic developments. Hence going forward, Moscow must set sail towards a sustainable and objective implementation of its oceanic vision. Therefore a  naval stratagem firm on the protection of national interests, resource building and diplomatic expansion may yield positive results in the years to come.

 

 

 

 

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