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The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor Project and the Israel-Gaza Crisis: A Test of Resilience or A Reality Check?

Vidya Gonuguntla writes, the proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), backed by the United States, shows skewed goals that might remain unfulfilled, in light of increasing volatility and geopolitical tensions escalating in the Middle East. Positions and plans that might be better understood as a game of power politics seeking to counter Chinese domination in the region, the highly anticipated project, might remain stillborn – as increased involvement in the region would mean greater chaos for the Middle East.

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), launched along the peripheries of the G20 summit in September 2023. It was envisaged as one of the most promising network projects, aimed at enhancing connectivity, efficiency, and logistical cost-cutting in transportation through a comprehensive transportation network  ̶  comprising rail, road, and sea routes, connecting India, the Middle East, and Europe.[1] This multi-billion-dollar cooperation envisions to connect the ports of West India, with UAE through rail and water networks, across the Arabian Peninsula, reaching the Israeli port of Haifa, from where goods would be shipped to Piraeus in Greece, and thenceforth into the European mainland.[2] Backed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by New Delhi with its co-signatories the United States (US), United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Germany, France, and the European Union (EU), this endeavour is exemplar of New Delhi’s increasing proximity to the security ecosystem of the US, driven by a growing alignment to propel a concerted effort to counter the increasingly assertive stance on China.[3] Foreseen as a catalyst for substantial benefits, the establishment of this corridor stands to facilitate the seamless transportation of commodities and services originating from India to multiple destinations including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Europe, followed by a reciprocal flow back to India, translating into an integrated Asia, Europe, and Middle East.[4] This channel is poised to augment India’s position and further solidify its standing as a dynamic and central figure in the international market. It would also ensure an amplification of India’s diplomatic outreach, reinforcing its strategic relationships in these regions. Aiming to foster a pivot toward Asia and viewed and promoted as a counter to the Chinese Belt Road Initiative (BRI), the intention of the IMEC is to redress China’s growing influence in the Middle East, a key factor of which lay in the mediation of the Saudi – Iranian conflict and the presence of a reliable link that would have followed the US-brokered Abraham Accords.[5]

However, what US President Joe Biden calls a “game-changing investment’, and “a real big deal”, with stakeholders imagining a fundamental design to leverage Arab countries to establish their own Middle East layout and influence, may just remain castles in the air.[6] Beginning with the fact that several existing plans to counter the BRI have never been followed through, or that the infrastructural and financing capacities of the proposers of the IMEC are insufficient, and moreover, a repackaging of pre-existing troubled connectivity projects which have failed to come to fruition,[7] the biggest revelation has been the ongoing Israel – Palestinian conflict. The start of the Hamas-Israel war on 7th Oct 2023 has brought to light deep political tensions, that foster frictions among the Saudi-Emirati-Israeli components of the plan  ̶ causing the Saudi to pause negotiations until the normalising of relations with Israel.[8]Surging public anger” in Israel and Jordan is likely to make any form of closer regional connectivity difficult in the short term, “even if it is pitched as technocratic rather than political in nature”. [9] Based on the presumption of peace in this region, the reality that the project would involve going through regions in the Middle East which are most volatile, has been a wake-up call. Kapoor mentions that “there is also the possibility that if Saudi Arabia remains unwilling to engage in negotiations with Israel, the highly anticipated IMEC project could end up being stillborn”.[10] India has taken up a stance, being one of the first non-Arab countries to recognise the Palestinian state, highlighting a shift from its previous foreign policy position of non-alignment.

As India’s economy grows rapidly and attempts to involve itself in security geopolitics and to become an economic stakeholder in the Middle East, the proposal of the IMEC and the backing by the US, shows skewed and questionable goals. The sincere aims of economic cooperation and ease of transportation stand to remain unfulfilled, and therefore a political gesture reduced to merely being a game of power politics.[11] The involvement of these actors within this region would only result in greater chaos and conflict, and therefore, it would be in the interest of the Middle to not participate in the IMEC, considering it would only lead them into more geopolitical conflicts. In light of this, the aims are not rooted in a genuine desire to establish a better economic corridor but to dismantle China’s position and gain a foothold in the Middle East region, and therefore, aligning oneself with the IMEC, seems unfeasible.

 

Endnotes

[1] Anil Sasi, “As Israel-Hamas conflict gets deadlier, what happens to the India-Europe economic corridor?”, The Indian Express, October 23, 2023, Accessed On: Amid Israel-Hamas war, what happens to India-Europe trade corridor (indianexpress.com)

[2] Jürgen Rüland and Elisabetta Nadalutti, “Is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor Dead on Arrival”, The Diplomat, 17 October, 2023, Accessed On: Is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor Dead on Arrival? – The Diplomat

[3] Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “The Geopolitics of the New India-Middle East-Europe Corridor”, The Diplomat, September 19, 2023, Accessed On: The Geopolitics of the New India-Middle East-Europe Corridor – The Diplomat

[4] Saptaparno Ghosh, “What purpose does the India-Middle East- Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) serve?” The Hindu (Explained), 15 September, 2023, Accessed On: What purpose does the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) serve? | Explained – The Hindu

[5] Anjana Pasricha, “Israel-Hamas Conflict Reality Check for India-Middle East-Economic-Corridor”, Voice of America (South and Central Asia), October 24, 2023, Accessed On: Israel-Hamas Conflict Reality Check for India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (voanews.com)

[6] S Ronendra Singh, “This is a real big deal”, says Joe Biden, announcing India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor”, The Hindu Business Line, 09  September, 2023, Accessed On: “This is a real big deal,” says Joe Biden, announcing India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor – The Hindu BusinessLine

[7] Hasan Alhasan and Viraj Solanki, “Obstacle to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 16, 2023, Accessed On: Obstacles to the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (iiss.org)

[8] Bill Hutchinson, “Israel-Hamas War: Timeline and key developments”, ABC News, 23 November, 2023, Accessed On: Israel-Hamas War: Timeline and key developments – ABC News (go.com)

[9] Tom Hussain, “Isarel-Gaza war: Is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor a ‘casualty’ of conflict?” South China Morning Post, October 21, 2023, Accessed on: Israel-Gaza war: Is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor a ‘casualty’ of conflict? | South China Morning Post (scmp.com)

[10] Sanjay Kapoor, “Israel Hamas War: The IMEC link to the escalations” The Probe, October 13, 2023, Accessed On: Israel Hamas War: The IMEC link to the escalations (theprobe.in)

[11] Global Times, “With Israeli-Palestinian conflict or not, IMEEC is just a castle in the air”, Global Times, October 11, 2023, Accessed On: With Israeli-Palestinian conflict or not, IMEEC is just a castle in the air – Global Times

 

 

Author: Vidya Gonuguntla, Research Intern, CS3, USI

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