The Taiwan Strait, a narrow and strategically vital waterway separating Taiwan from mainland China, has become a focal point of international military activity. Incidentally, the current situation is marked by increased maritime manoeuvres from both China and NATO allies, reflecting heightened tensions and strategic interests in the region. This blog delves into the current landscape of foreign warship crossings in the Taiwan Strait, exploring their significance and implications.
What is the Taiwan Strait?
The Taiwan Strait is a 130-kilometer-wide channel separating Taiwan from the southeastern coast of China. It connects the East China Sea to the South China Sea and serves as a crucial conduit for international trade and maritime traffic. The strait’s strategic importance is underscored by its role as a key route for global shipping and energy supplies, with an estimated $300 billion worth of goods passing through it daily.[i] Additionally, the strait is a vital communication link between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, impacting regional stability and security.
Incidents of Foreign Warship Crossings
Recent developments have seen a notable increase in foreign warships crossing the Taiwan Strait, reflecting the region’s complex geopolitical dynamics. For instance, in January 2024, the U.S. Navy’s USS John Basilone, a destroyer, made headlines as it became the first American warship to transit the Taiwan Strait following Taiwan’s election.[ii] This move was seen as a reaffirmation of U.S. support for Taiwan amid rising tensions with China.
Following this, in August 2024, the Canadian Navy’s HMCS Vancouver also transited the strait, a move that drew a strong reaction from Beijing.[iii] According to Reuters, China’s Foreign Ministry condemned the crossing, accusing Canada of provoking regional instability. In addition to these instances, the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet reported another transit by the USS Ronald Reagan in late August 2024, underscoring the continued international interest and involvement in the region.[iv]
China’s Response
China has responded robustly to these foreign military movements, often framing them as provocations. The Chinese government views such crossings as direct challenges to its sovereignty and a threat to regional peace. In response to the increased military presence, China has conducted multiple military exercises and heightened its naval and aerial patrols around Taiwan. For example, in August 2024, Taiwan reported detecting 15 Chinese military aircraft and six naval ships around the island, highlighting the heightened military alertness in response to foreign naval activity.[v] Furthermore, China has also conducted exercises Joint Sword 2024A and Joint Sword 2024B (in Oct 2024) in order to illustrate its sovereign claims over Taiwan and also send a strong signal to ‘deter separatist extremists’.[vi]
Strategic Importance of Crossings
The strategic importance of these crossings extends beyond immediate military implications. For NATO allies and other international actors, traversing the Taiwan Strait is a demonstration of commitment to maintaining open sea lanes and supporting Taiwan’s autonomy. It serves as a counterbalance to China’s growing assertiveness and attempts to exert control over the region. Moreover, these manoeuvres underscore the broader strategic competition between major powers, reflecting the balance of power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.
Could India Consider Crossing the Strait?
Most of India’s trade with the East takes place through the Taiwan Strait. The Indian Minister of State of External Affairs in the Lok Sabha quoted that Indian trade of US$ 5 Trillion passes through the South China Sea, and therefore the Taiwan Strait.[vii] Though, it will be hard to gauge the exact damage the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis could cause to the Indian economy, it is comprehensible that the crisis will affect all segments of it.[viii] Given the evolving geopolitical landscape, speculation about India’s potential involvement in the Taiwan Strait has emerged. India, with its growing strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, might consider participating in such manoeuvres to assert its influence and support international norms. However, as of now, there are no confirmed reports of Indian warships planning to transit the Taiwan Strait. India’s strategic approach remains cautious, balancing its interests in maintaining regional stability with its complex relationships with both the United States and China.
Conclusion
The crossing of foreign warships through the Taiwan Strait amidst rising tensions highlights the strategic significance of this narrow waterway. Each transit by countries such as the United States and Canada represents a deliberate gesture of support for Taiwan and a challenge to China’s expansive claims. As the situation continues to evolve, the international community will be closely watching how these maritime manoeuvres shape the geopolitical dynamics of the region.
By: Manah P, Research Assistant, CS3, USI
Endnotes
[i] Bodeen, Christopher. “China Criticizes US for Passing Warship Through Taiwan Strait | AP News.” AP News, May 9, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/china-us-taiwan-strait-8bcc1b0f6bc60cc254938abf532cf7be.
[ii] Reuters. “U.S. Navy Sends First Warship Through Taiwan Strait Post-election.” CNBC, January 25, 2024. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/25/us-navy-sends-first-warship-through-taiwan-strait-post-election.html.
[iii] Pomfret, James, and Ismail Shakil. “Canadian warship passes through Taiwan Strait, drawing China’s ire.” Reuters. August 1, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/canadian-warship-passes-through-taiwan-strait-drawing-chinas-ire-2024-08-01/.
[iv] Shelbourne, Mallory. “U.S. Destroyer Sails Through Taiwan Strait Transit.” USNI News. August 22, 2024. https://news.usni.org/2024/08/22/u-s-destroyer-sails-through-taiwan-strait-transit.
[v] ANI. “Taiwan Detects 15 Chinese Military Aircraft, 6 Naval Ships Around Island.” Business Standard. June 23, 2024. https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/taiwan-detects-15-chinese-military-aircraft-6-naval-ships-around-island-124062300207_1.html.
[vi] Green, Erik, and Meia Nouwens. 2024. “China’s Joint-Sword B Exercise: A Calculated Follow-on.” IISS. October 23, 2024. Accessed October 20, 2024. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/10/chinas-joint-sword-b-exercise-a-calculated-follow-on/.
[vii] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “QUESTION NO. †4832 INDIAN TRADE THROUGH SOUTH CHINA SEA,” April 1, 2022. https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/35118/question+no+4832+indian+trade+through+south+china+sea.
[viii] Gokhale, Vijay. “What Should India Do Before the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 17, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/04/what-should-india-do-before-the-next-taiwan-strait-crisis?lang=en.