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Journey from the ashes of DTTI to iCET

The iCET moniker has generated a lot of debate over the last several days and has left the general public perplexed.[i]Strategic communities and policy planners have given this a lot of room. However, in order to comprehend the meaning of the term “iCET,” one must make an effort to comprehend the wider picture that has evolved through time. We need even to analyse the decade-long ups and down efforts from both Indo-US side to push for such initiatives.

In order to advance the nation’s strategic technological ties and industrial cooperation in the defence industry, US and India jointly launched the Initiative on Essential and Emerging Technologies (iCET) in Washington 2022.[ii] The initiative appears to be a more technically advanced version of the previous bilateral Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) between New Delhi and Washington, which had failed miserably in its ambitious goals.

A look at failed DTTI initiative

Following four years of discussions, the DTTI was enthusiastically introduced in Delhi by then US deputy defence secretary Ashton Carter in 2012.[iii] Its goal was to advance defence cooperation between the two newly formed strategic partners, free from obstacles imposed by either side’s bureaucracy.

It primarily consisted of four “pathfinder” projects, ranging wide range of joint developments of sophisticated equipments. The DTTI programme received barely warm support from local vendors and was therefore covertly cancelled. After that, in June 2015, India and the US extended their bilateral 10-year defence framework agreement till 2025 in order to strengthen their military and strategic relations as well as to provide the foundation for developing the DTTI. However, neither of the proposed projects made any progress beyond the discussion stage. In the meantime, the US classified India as a “major defence partner” in December 2016 and vowed to advance military technology transfers, ease weapons interoperability, and advance shared security interests and intelligence. Later the same year, US Senate Bill ‘Enhancing Defence and Security Co-operation’ with India was passed, a committee was constituted to monitor the development in cooperation but this acted like a limbo, and thus the entire DTTI Initiative vanished.

The inverse relationship between the DTTI’s decline and the exponential growth of bilateral strategic relationships between New Delhi and Washington was clearly seen but there was a significant divide between the two sides that needed to be filled, ultimately everything crumbled without ever accomplishing its goals.

What’s new in iCET?

Years later, on the ashes of the DTTI, the iCET envisions six major areas of collaboration, including co-development and co-production of crucial future technologies in the fields of defence, space, next-generation telecoms, AI, biotechnology and semiconductors. iCET is an alphabet soup of acronyms as like DTTI between Indo-US hi-tech collaborative effort between industry, academia, research organisations, and think tanks rather than just a G2G arrangement. Contrary to the prior established process of high-level meetings, which were restricted within the bounds of governments, it adopts a new, radical structure to include top academic & research institutions and business houses. The current iCET framework breaks the customary high-level diplomatic slowness and tardiness.

Challenges Ahead

The iCET continues to face difficulties as it emerges from the shadow of the failed DTTI effort. Despite the significant progress made between the countries, the U.S.’s strict export control system remains the main barrier.[iv] It would be difficult to modify the US’s tight export control regulations, which are quietly regulated and governed by its strong weapons industrial complex. Washington forbids India from repairing and customising US military hardware to suit its requirements without the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM)’s permission. “Significantly, all US military purchases by India via the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route had been concluded under the stricter ‘Golden Sentry’ End-User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) which governs physical verification of the equipment. This protocol is stricter than the ‘Blue Lantern’ EUMA, which regulates the international direct commercial sale of US goods.”[v]

Way Ahead

The US has to be more lenient on its export laws to show flexibility and intent if it wants to considerably increase collaborative research and manufacturing of defence equipment with India. If not, iCET may eventually sink without a trace, just like the DTTI.

[i]  SUMEDA, “Explained | What is the India, U.S. initiative on future tech?”, The Hindu, 18th June, 2023 (Accessed on 18th June, 2023)

[ii]  “Prime Minister’s meeting with President of the United States of America”, PIB Delhi, 24th May, 2022 (Accessed on 18th June, 2023)

[iii]  JAVIN ARYAN, “The Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI): Lost in the acronym bowl”, ORF, 10 Dec, 2020 (Accessed on 19th June, 2023)

[iv]  “US `gets’ right to inspect defence equipment, tech sold to India” TOI, 21st July, 2009 (Accessed on 19th June, 2023)

[v]  “End-Use Monitoring of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles”, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. Department of State, 20thJan, 2021 (Accessed on 19th June, 2023)

 

Authored by: Om Ranjan, Research Intern, USI

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