How do you assess India’s strikes on Pakistan in retaliation for the Pulwama terror attacks?
The strikes underscore India’s new red lines and resolve to fight cross- border terrorism on the Pakistani soil. India’s actions have received a lot of domestic and international support and even led to some lukewarm reconciliatory moves from Prime Minister Imran Khan towards India, including declaration of some half-baked measures to rein in what we call the jihadis or non-state militias. So, on the whole I think it is a good thing that India has upped the ante and called Pakistan’s bluff. Diplomatically, India has gained moral ascendancy over Pakistan.
India seems to have lost to Pakistan as far as the optics went.
I would like to correct this misperception. Pakistan has no international credibility if you see its track record. During the Kargil conflict they had disowned their own dead, right? Similarly, they had also feigned ignorance about the presence of Osama bin Laden there. They hid the news of death of Mullah Omar for two years. So they are in the business of subterfuge and disinformation. Now they are trying to peddle a narrative that Indian strikes in Balakote were ineffective and that India did not down an F16 aircraft.
I would request you to critically analyse the tweets of DG ISPR Maj. Gen. Asif Ghafoor, which he had made in the heat of the moment, wherein he had said that they [Pakistan] had brought down two pilots and one pilot has been admitted to the hospital. His subsequent media conferences are equally illustrative. There were also pictures of parachutes and intercepts of some Pakistani military soldiers that two aircraft and two parachutes were seen coming down. These observations were complemented by the AM-RAAM missile (fired by F16 only), which fell on the Indian side and also by certain electronic signatures which our side had picked up. The Indian Air Force (IAF) had put out a plausible narrative to support Indian claims.
Pakistani narrative received traction from that [one] article in [publication] Foreign Policy, which said that some kind of head count had been done by the US and there was no loss of any F16. This has been denied by the Pentagon, that to the best of their knowledge no such stock taking was carried out. In his latest media conference, the DGISPR continued to harp that Pakistan has shot down two Indian aircraft and that one helicopter was downed by friendly Indian fire. Which is this second Indian aircraft? It is a white lie that India lost another fighter aircraft. To me it appears Pakistan is trying to camouflage the loss of its F16 by keeping falsely saying India lost two aircraft in the duel. This impression is further reinforced by the US statement wherein they refused to certify whether Pakistan had used F16 against India. So that can tell you about how far the Pakistani narrative is true or false.
The second issue is about the efficacy of the Indian strikes in Balakote. Now why did it take Pakistan 43 days to choreograph the visit of diplomats and journalists to the site of bombings? And they were taken only to some select buildings there and not to the buildings targeted by the IAF. So the mere fact that they have taken so much of time to take the people there, itself tells you that the whole thing has been decked up.
Now how many casualties India has inflicted on them is a question mark. That Italian journalist, Francesca Marino, if you remember, had immediately put a number around 35. At the same time the high casualty figures put by Indian media and some of our political leaders may be hyped. In my view, some amount of damage has been caused, but Pakistan has been able to put it under the wraps and is now trying to put up a facade. But in this entire episode there are lessons for India; first we need to enhance our ground level intelligence to correctly assess and gather evidence of post–strike damage and, the second, we need an integrated information operations strategy or we shall have too many cooks spoiling the taste of our efforts.
In case of another similar terror attack, will it be prudent for India to repeat such punitive strikes?
If Pakistan’s complicity in any future strikes is suspected or established, India’s punitive strikes will be far more lethal and debilitating. India is well prepared to move up the escalatory ladder and call Pakistan’s bluff. This is not only a security imperative, but also a political imperative for any government- given the pent up nationalistic fervor that has developed in the country against Pakistan’s sustained terrorist strikes against India.
What do you make of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s statement in his interview to Reuters recently that he sees better chance of peace talks with India if the BJP wins the parliamentary elections?
Well, he is right to the extent that only a strong government that enjoys a majority can take bold decisions on Pakistan, rather than a rag tag coalition. Common sense tells us that NDA has better chancing of retaining power; not so much because of their delivery of promises but due to lack of a viable alternative at the present juncture. But irrespective of whichever government is in power there is unlikely to be any concessions on Kashmir or fight against terrorism .Yes, if Pakistan shuns terrorism, there can be a rebooting of the trade across the Line of Control and reopening of people to people contacts. We can evolve a new modus vivendi on Kashmir. The ball is in Pakistan’s court to deliver on India’s concerns over cross-border terrorism and pave the way for taking the dialogue process further.
Imran Khan also said there is no need for Pakistan to harbour non-state militias. Will he follow through or does he simply not have the power?
Despite the stubbornness of Pakistan’s military establishment it is difficult for Pakistan to ignore the new geo-political realities. Its economy is in doldrums, it is on the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force, and runs the risk of even being put on the black list which would add to Pakistan’s economic woes. India has scored a major diplomatic victory against Pakistan with the successful passing of UN Resolution 1267, after China dropped its technical hold. Pakistan has been compelled to act against Mohd Masood Azhar. India must closely monitor actions of Pakistan and if Pakistan hoodwinks the international community then we should present a strong case for putting Islamabad in the black list of FATF. Cross border terrorism has also strained Pakistan’s relations with Iran and Afghanistan – its other two neighbours. For example, the killing of the Iranian Republican Guards provoked a very strong reaction from Iran to take punitive actions. Similarly, whatever is going on along the Durand Line – they are fencing it and establishing posts – and every other day there are standoffs with Afghanistan that side. So I would say that Pakistan stands isolated regionally and internationally and hope that these new realities make them change their track and nudge them to crack down on jihadis across the board, without distinguishing between good and bad terrorists, or between anti-Indian terrorists and other terrorists.
What do you think will take for India to neutralize the threat from Pakistan?
My way of looking at it is that there are some basic strategic thrusts we have to follow concurrently. First, enhance our deterrence capability against Pakistan, including its proxy war which would entail developing non-contact non-kinetic asymmetric capabilities and also the ability to strike at (terrorist) leadership targets and terrorist infrastructure inside Pakistan. For that we need more effective surveillance and targeting means and use of disruptive and precision technology based systems. Second, is to garner regional and international support and isolate Pakistan. Third, if Pakistan shows some tangible signs of cracking down on terrorist infrastructure then revival of composite dialogue must commence in the right earnest. So I feel that if we take these three steps, we should be able to move forward in our relations with Pakistan .
How can India wean China away from Pakistan? Or make it see/understand its concerns?
Weaning away China from Pakistan in the classic sense may not be feasible due to their strong symbiotic relationship. China in its overall strategic calculus needs Pakistan to balance India and gain access to the Indian Ocean through the Arabian Sea and promote its interest in Afghanistan. Similarly, China is Pakistan’s trump card against India. However, we should convincingly impress upon China to understand and respect India’s core interests, particularly India’s sensitivities on cross-border terrorism. We should also impress upon the Chinese who are facing a very serious problem in Xinjiang about the risk of dealing with terrorism on a selective basis. This Wahhabi ideology will come to haunt them sooner or later.
Another issue of engagement with the Chinese is to create interdependence and complementarities in our economic relations thus making them stakeholders in the peace and stability of India. Further, we need to maximize our own space and options by having multi-lateral engagements with other democracies. For example, with this idea of the Indo-Pacific Trade Corridor or Asia Africa Growth Corridor, we are able to provide more choices to the countries of the Indian Ocean littoral and to the South Asian countries. Once India’s position is strengthened and we emerge as a legitimate pre-eminent power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, we can network with the Chinese to have a win-win paradigm in terms of developing the linkages between their transit and trade corridors and our transit and trade corridors. Probably, then Chinese reliance on Pakistan will reduce and there will be a better incentive for them to co-operate with India. But all politico – economic and diplomatic initiatives must be backed by India having strong military capabilities.
We saw some third party mediation this time during India Pakistan crisis. Do you feel the time has come for third party mediation?
Facilitation and using good office by one state to promote dialogue between the contesting states is an established international norm. But it should not be misconstrued for classic mediation. If you are referring to the recent stand-off between Pakistan and India and the role played by the UAE, US, Saudi Arabia, this was more of using their goodwill on both sides to get them [Pakistan] to hand over the Wing Commander to us and probably not move up the escalation ladder. But this does not mean India will accept any third party role on Kashmir and in other bilateral disputes. The two countries can directly commence composite dialogue subject to Pakistan stopping cross-border terrorism and tone down its genetically ingrained animosity towards India. Pakistan cannot keep hurting India by using terrorists and yet expect India to come to the negotiation table. Pakistan must understand the new reference point for resumption of dialogue process.
How do you assess the current situation in Afghanistan?
The current security scenario in Afghanistan is fragile and mired in critical uncertainties. Taliban control about 50% of the territory there, are running shadow governments in the southern and eastern provinces, the spectre of jihadiviolence has spread to the northern and the western provinces, and the incidents of sectarian violence have increased. President Ghani is said that since 2015 Afghan National Security and Defence Forces (ANSDF) have suffered more than 30,000 fatalities, which is an unsustainable rate of casualties. The news of withdrawal of US troops has further dampened the morale of the ANSDF.
Meanwhile, last summer the Taliban forces had launched operation ‘Khandaq’ and they took it as a big success. This year they have code named their spring offensive as ‘Fateh’ – that means victory – implying this is the culminating phase of their military campaign in Afghanistan. They believe that their cliché, “Americans have the watches and we have the time” is coming true. [The] Taliban are stepping up the tempo of military operations to negotiate from a position of strength.
I would like to flag another complicated dimension that makes peace look elusive in Afghanistan. Taliban are not monolithic, there are a number of other terrorist groups that operate in Afghanistan. As per the Afghan security experts, you have the foreign fighters, of which some 500 odd [are] Al Qaeda cadres, from the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), which mainly comprises 70% of Orkazai and Afridi tribesmen from the north-western frontier, estimated to be around 4000. Then you have another rung of regional terrorist organisations, estimated to be about 2000, which includes Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East Turkestan Islamic Movement and Jamaite-ansur-allah, these are mostly active in north Afghanistan. Then the third group is a multitude of Pakistan-based terrorist outfits, estimated to be about 10,000, which includes Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and few more. Within the Afghan Taliban there are estimated to be 45000 fighters, dominated by the Haqqani network.
Negotiations with one group may not suit other groups. Given the factional nature of jihadists and their propensity to fight, the pot of violence in Afghanistan will keep boiling in the times to come. For now, there appears to be no light at the end of the tunnel.
India seems to be getting side-lined with its principled stand of talking only to the Afghan government. India did send representatives to the Moscow talks where the Taliban were also present. Should it not open direct communication with the group?
I would like to say that the ongoing reconciliation process per se is mired in uncertainties. On one track you have the High Peace Council, appointed by the former President Karzai, and the newly constituted 11 member group by President Ashraf Ghani, who have linkages with the Taliban. At the second track, you have the Moscow format, which comprises Russia, Iran, China, Pakistan, and even India on the side-lines. The third is the talks between Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad and the Doha office representative Mullah [Abdul Ghani] Baradar. So these are the three levels at which negotiations are taking place.
There is a zero sum approach to the whole reconciliation process. Taliban have not toned down their laid down conditions, that is non-recognition of govt of Afghanistan, non-recognition of the Constitution, release of some 30,000 odd prisoners, withdrawal of the American troops etc. Nor is there any clarity about what kind of political dispensation is going to come up. Will there be an interim government? What kind of power sharing will there be between Taliban and any new dispensation? The parliamentary election results are withheld, will the presidential elections take place by September 2019?
In the meanwhile, the Consultative Loya Jirga proceedings concluded on 03 May 5, 2019, after five days of deliberations. At least 3,200 delegates from across the country participated. The Grand Consultative Jirga has passed a 23-Article resolution. In sum they decided that a National Peace Consulting Body should be formed for negotiations with Taliban. Other decisions are to preserve the system of governance and security sector, no changes in the Islamic republic system and constitution, ceasefire with Taliban, diplomatic isolation of countries who provide financial military support to terrorists, non acceptance of interim government, continuation of election process, creation of peace office for Taliban in Kabul, withdrawal of foreign troops, commence intra Afghan talks, cooperation of regional and international organizations for peace, particularly United Nations and the government of Afghanistan, all members of UNSC should be present in the negotiations besides USA. Some of the aforesaid points are in contrast to stated Taliban, Pakistan and the US positions. We need to closely watch reactions of all stakeholders to this new development.
Under these circumstances it would be naïve for India to take a firm and concrete stand. India should not get trapped in the choppy waters of Afghan politics. India is the only country that has adopted a consistent position, and that is to support an ‘Afghan-owned, Afghan-led, and Afghan-controlled’ peace process. Other countries have taken a volte face, for example, Russia and Iran, have taken a diametrically opposite position vis vis their past support to the Northern Alliance; China too has been blowing hot and cold. India’s policy consistency and significant contribution in civil capacity building has made us popular across the politico-ethnic spectrum in Afghanistan. India should leverage this competitive advantage with the new political dispensation and the people of Afghanistan.
Now this does not mean that we don’t have the channels open with the Taliban. While the government’s stated policy is that we would support the govt or the interim govt of Afghanistan, but I’m certain that at an informal level we have the ways and means to access some segments of Taliban. India has a sophisticated understanding of Afghanistan dynamics and I am certain New Delhi will review and recalibrate its Afghan policy based on the evolving geopolitical realities in Afghanistan and in the region as a whole.
A US withdrawal from Afghanistan is sure to herald the entry of China in its place there. What would the implications be for India?
I do not subscribe to this perspective that the Chinese will have any direct involvement in Afghanistan. It is against their stated policy and they don’t get into this kind of a mess. The Chinese have other means and ways to secure and promote their interest in Afghanistan. What are their interests? First and foremost, they want to insulate the Belt and Road projects in Central Asia. They don’t want any spill-over of the violence from Afghanistan into Central Asia. Second, they don’t want northern Afghanistan becomes a base for the activities of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement to heighten their activities in the Xinjiang region. Third, they want to secure their investments in the Aynik copper mines and also they have plans to prospect oil in the northern Amu Darya basin in Afghanistan. China has denied that they will actually be deploying any troops to set up a so called brigade size base in the Wukhan corridor.
But indirectly, China is seeking an enhanced role in Afghanistan. They have offered to extend China Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan and may leverage their influence in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in which Kabul is an observer, to shape the geopolitical landscape in Afghanistan. The SCO declarations in Astana and in Qingdao about peace building in Afghanistan allude to this assessment. China understands that Russia is sensitive to an enhanced role by any other country in Afghanistan .The SCO is therefore a preferred option for China to allay Russian concerns and symbolically keep India in good humour.