Maj Gen Pawan Anand, AVSM (Retd) Writes:
The US 7th Fleet aircraft carrier, USS Theodore Roosevelt, carries the biggest punch in the Pacific Ocean. When its Captain is sacked overnight, something serious is afoot. It has drawn the attention of militaries across the globe. So, what triggered it and what does it mean to those of us who observe these happenings closely.
The Facts as revealed
The San Francisco Chronicle published on 31st March, that it had in its hands a memo from Captain Brett E Crozier that sought to evacuate and quarantine about 90% of the 4000-strong crew off the Carrier, since they suffered the risk of spread of the coronavirus infection. The balance crew would be able run essential services, disinfect the ship and run its nuclear reactors. A leaked copy of the memo was appended. Crozier is reported to have stated that social distancing on board was not possible, and testing alone was not going to check the spread of the disease.
“If we do not act now, we are failing to properly take
care of our most trusted asset—our sailors”.
Captain Brett E Crozier, USS Theodore Roosevelt
Acting Secretary Navy, Thomas Modly announced 2nd April of the removal of Captain Crozier from command, stating[1] the Captain exhibited “extremely poor judgement in the middle of a crisis”. Commanders needed to have a more “agile and resilient mindset …. Command is a sacred trust that must be continually earned, both from the Sailors and Marines one leads, and from the institution which grants that special, honoured privilege”. Modly felt that the March 30th memo[2]
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was sent to too many people (more than 20) and having “raised alarm bells unnecessarily”, created panic amoung not only the crew but also their families.
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Did not correctly reflect the conditions on board – 114 sailors had tested positive, none hospitalised, although more were likely to fall ill. The ship had six ventilators, and no sailors would die, as per discussions with numerous officers.
Navy Chief Admiral Gilday initially praised the request and actions taken by Captain Crozier, but later castigated the approach taken by him. There appears to have been a change of stance after interaction with the A/Secretary. There is no news whether he faces any action, but presumably his actions will draw scrutiny.
Members of the House Armed Services Committee wrote they disagreed with the Secretary Navy, and called it an “over-reaction”[3]. They felt that
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Captain Crozier clearly went outside his chain of command. His leaked memo if sent on unsecure communications (non-classified email), needed to be investigated.
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He was “justifiably concerned”, although he did not handle the pressure appropriately.
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His dismissal was a destabilising move putting servicemen at risk and jeopardising fleet readiness.
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Department of Defense and Secretary Esper were “admonished” for not issuing clear guidance on how to handle the crisis, forcing commanders to “make decisions on matters outside of their expertise while under immense pressure”.
The number of positive cases in the carrier increased from three to 100 from March 24 till April 2. Captain Crozier was given a rousing send off by the crew, a video grab of which went viral globally.
In November 2019, President Trump intervened in personnel action taken against Chief Petty Officer Eddie Gallagher, resulting in the removal of Secretary Spencer and appointment of Thomas Modly as Acting Secretary of the Navy.[4] On April 4, 2020, it was reported that President Trump criticised the Captain of the Carrier for making a port of call in Vietnam” and called his letter to the Navy leadership as “inappropriate”. It emerged that the port of call was ordered by Admiral Davidson, Commander of the Indo-Pacific Fleet[5].
Acting Secretary Navy Thomas Modly voluntarily resigned from his post on April 7, 2020.
Certain other emerging facts reveal some unconnected dots –
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The US Army Northern Command sent a briefing document on February 3, 2020, to Army Secretary McCarthy, stating that existing coronavirus data suggested that “between 300,000 to 500,000 may require hospitalisation” and that upto “150,000 may die”. Whether it was sent to Defense Secretary Esper is not clearly known[6].
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In June 2017, USS Fitzgerald collided with a cargo ship in the Sea of Japan. In August 2017, USS John S McCain collided with an oil tanker in the Singapore Straits. A number of senior commanders of admiral rank in the 7th Fleet were sacked, and captain of one of these ships recommended for court martial. Was the Navy running its ships “too hard, too fast”[7]
What do these facts point to
Errors of Judgement and Lack of Hierarchical Confidence. A rousing and visibly spontaneous send off by the crew for their captain, and release of the video by crew men in open social media reflected their ire at the decision to relieve their captain of his command. Despite advice from the Navy Chief, Modly decided to take action against the Captain on two counts, lapse of judgement and loss of confidence in his ability to carry on with the task at hand (to doggedly pursue an alleged geo-political aim in the Indo-Pacific despite the ongoing pandemic). Given the magnitude of threat from the virus in the closed confines of the carrier, it is anybody’s guess where the lack of judgement lies.
“CAPT Crozier is an honorable man, who despite this uncharacteristic lapse of
judgment, has dedicated himself throughout a lifetime of incredible service to
our nation….. This decision is not one of retribution. It is about confidence.
It is not an indictment of character, but rather of judgement”.
Acting Secretary Navy, Thomas Modly
Lack of confidence both up and down the chain of command, was on display within a matter of hours – why did the Captain choose to use unsecure email, bypassing his channels of command; and the Acting Secretary take little time in arriving at a strong judgement? The answer perhaps lies in two vaults. First, differing perceptions of the two men, one perceived the health threat to his massive crew-strength as grave since he was not in a war situation, and the other perceiving the geo-political ends as primary. Second, it is possible the latter was driven by a desire to ensure success in or at least a display of it for the benefit of his political boss (POTUS – the supreme commander of the armed forces).
Fatigue. The incident raises questions on to whether the US 7th Fleet is being over deployed in the Indo-Pacific waters. Reports of strained resources and fatigued crews appear to have been the underlying causes for the collisions of two destroyers in 2017 in these waters. This recent incident begs the question – is this resource crunch, over deployment and crew-fatigue beginning to tell on their professional judgement? Perhaps so. It is also a telling indictment on professional judgement all the way up the channels of command ending with the political hierarchy, for different reasons. Some of these are flagged below,
Professional Opportunism? Naval Chief, Admiral Gilday changed his stance – praising the Captain- then castigating him for bypassing the chain of command. Admiral Davidson, Commander of the Pacific Fleet was bypassed by the Captain -was it with his tacit nod or was it lack of decisive involvement? In either case it points to lack of confidence by his command. The issue barely seems to have drawn the attention of the Secretary Defense Esper, until it blew out of proportion. And where during all this was the Chief of Defense Staff? At the highest levels of the Navy, there appears to be a “hands-off” approach, an apparent reluctance to take a decisive position! Professional opportunism is often driven by the firm resolve to take no decisive stance and avoid responsibility. This is not unknown to military hierarchies, especially those driven by careerism. The US military has seen its repercussions from Vietnam to Afghanistan. Lessons are surely learnt, but ignored with alacrity to avoid political disfavour.
Geo-political overdrive with Political undertones. The US political hierarchy downplayed the impact of the coronavirus, hoping it would be overcome in a matter of weeks. It therefore stressed on power projection in a time of crisis. It is evident the virulence of the pandemic was under estimated. Many lives of the crew may have been saved; but the saga will not go unnoticed by their rivals/enemies.
“While we may not be at war in a traditional sense, neither are we truly
at peace. Authoritarian regimes are on the rise. Many nations are
reaching, in many ways, to reduce our capacity to accomplish our national goals”.
Acting Navy Secretary of the US, Thomas Modly
Chinks in the US armour. The US Army Northern Command’s assessment of large-scale deaths due to the virus seems to have escaped attention of the powers that be. The assessment of the brief was apparently not shared upto the Defense Secretary. It was certainly not shared with the Navy, leave alone examined by their health authorities. An integrated information sharing mechanism and enlightened debate between different arms of the military is conspicuously highlighted. The impact of the virus on the US economy is likely to be much heavier than Asian economies, particularly the Chinese. Surely the Chinese will be observing with keen eyes. It may well encourage them to embark on misadventures, confident in their Anti Access/Area Denial capabilities. The US will have to work harder to keep their power projection capabilities intact.
What’s there in it for us-Through the Indian Prism
Armed forces deliberately maintain a culture of not admitting to mistakes even when clearly confronted with poor professional judgements. This needs to be examined periodically with professional honesty; individual personalities have NO place here. The Indian military needs to deliberate upon this openly, not hidden from view under the cover of security or impact on morale. What better time than this to discuss the issue threadbare, publicly. Two ex-chiefs of the Indian Navy have voiced their opinions, stating the Captain Crozier was wrong in going public with his judgement, and the Secretary Navy was wrong in sacking him without a probe[8]. The Indian Navy Chief has come out with a video in social media where he addresses naval personnel on how to handle the COVID situation. The Army Chief had earlier stated unequivocally that force protection was his first priority, the tasks at hand in COVID inflicted areas came next. Neither of them has expressed the need for us to introspect, draw lessons and evaluate our state of affairs – at least not openly; they may have done so in private.
Too many intermediary commanders with diffused accountability? Military commanders face multiple and sometimes competing loyalties. Better communications enable chains of command to be shortened in operational situations, even at the cost of reluctant hierarchies.
Operational preparedness is directly related to health of troops, particularly those engaged in direct action. Slim’s army faced a casualty ratio of 120 to malaria, against one to enemy action. These home lessons are often forgotten in favour of the glamour quotient of visible action in full media glare. Selection of senior military commanders needs to take into account their capacity for width of vision and areas of expertise. The generalist may make way for the specialist; instead are more layers are being created between top commanders and specialists?
Politico-Military hierarchies must abhor a “shoot the messenger” syndrome. The US senate has a fair number of senior representatives who have served in the military, familiar with their military culture and actively involved in service issues. Yet, they faltered. In the Indian context this element is missing, and more direct involvement by politicos would be necessary to develop confidence in mutual professional capabilities.
It is time for us to introspect too – Is there a gap in communication between personnel in the field and top leadership ensconced in HQ? Is there a difference in perception between those at different levels of the hierarchy? If so, then how is this change managed when these same personnel move on transfers from field appointments to staff where decision making is layered and accountability diffused. How is the chain of command to be respected when time bound decisions are to be taken? Are flatter organisations the answer?
The “need to know” tenet keeping operational personnel in the dark is often an excuse to avoid accountability and uncomfortable questions. It is possible that setting an example through disciplinary action assist in covering up for inadequate action or incorrect judgement by higher commanders or bureaucrats, and what impact does it have on the rank and file in this day of mass communication and social media? Will representing a strong point of view up the channel of command result in an end to careers of military commanders?
The Indian military is experiencing throes of change- integrated command structures, downsizing and then creation of modern non-contact warfare structures and platforms, beside an evolving service culture of the rank and file in the glare of social media. Change management has to be calibrated and flatter organisational structures conceived. There is no place for ham-handedness and bluster. The incident of the USS Theodore Roosevelt raises more questions for us than answers, there is no clear answer to any of them.… change demands honesty and faith, and men of character.
End notes
[1] Statement From SECNAV on Relief of CO Aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), April 4th, 2020, Office of the Navy Chief of Information, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=112537
[2] Jeff Schogol, “Navy fires USS Theodore Roosevelt captain who warned ‘sailors do not need to die’ from COVID-19 in leaked letter”, Task & Purpose, April 2, 2020, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/uss-theodore-roosevelt-captain-fired-coronavirus-letter.
[3] David Roza, Lawmakers decry Navy firing of USS Roosevelt captain as an ‘overreaction’ that puts sailors ‘at greater risk’, April 2, 2020, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/lawmakers-blast-navy-for-firing-theodore-roosevelt-captain
[4] Lindsay Cohn, Alice Friend and Jim Golby , “This is what was so unusual about the U.S. Navy making Captain Brett Crozier step down”, The Washington Post, April 5, 2020
[5] Paul Szoldra, “Trump blames Capt. Crozier for stopping in Vietnam and calls letter to Navy leadership ‘inappropriate’”, Apr 4, 2020, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/trump-criticize-brett-crozier,
[6] Haley Britzky, “The Army warned in early February that up to 150,000 Americans could die of COVID-19”, Apr 2, 2020https://taskandpurpose.com/news/army-assessment-coronavirus,,
[7] T. Christian Miller and Megan Rose, ”It’s hardly shocking the Navy fired a commander for warning of COVID-19 threat. It’s part of a pattern”, ProPublica, Apr 5, 2020
[8] Snehesh Alex Philip, “Indian Navy veterans slam ‘childish’ US response to Roosevelt ship incident”, The Print, April 08, 2020.
Maj Gen Pawan Anand is a Distinguished Fellow at CS3, USI of India. He is concurrently pursuing his PhD with Symbiosis, Pune
Article uploaded on 21-04-2020
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he belongs to or of the USI of India.