Mao Zedong was serious when he had preached the five fingers concept for Tibet in the 1950s. While Tibet was the palm, the five fingers were Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Arunachal Pradesh which it calls South Tibet. Of these China has recognised Sikkim as being part of India in 2003. It already has a portion of Ladakh in its pocket and is seeking more, has entered Nepal in a big way, and made it very clear that Arunachal Pradesh is theirs and now China is claiming parts of Eastern Bhutan adjoining India’s Arunachal Pradesh.

Bhutan has been a sovereign country since time immemorial and has no historic links with China. The two do not share any diplomatic relations and conduct all their dealings through their missions in New Delhi. Boundary talks between China and Bhutan began in 1972 with the participation of India but became bilateral since 1984. The two countries have signed an Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity for their 470 km long border in 1998. Twenty-four rounds of boundary talks have been held between China and Bhutan from 1984 to 2016[1].

That Bhutan is strategically important for India needs no emphasis. With China to its north, Bhutan is wedged between the Indian states of Sikkim to its west and Arunachal Pradesh in its east. Its location is of significance to India because while its western flank guards the entry to the sensitive Siliguri Corridor from the north, its eastern end blocks access to Tawang district which is adjacent to it. The border between China and Bhutan not being delineated nor demarcated has led to three areas being declared disputed. In Northern Bhutan or the central sector are Pasamlung and Jakarlung covering 495 square kilometres and in the West, it is the area of Doklam over 269 square kilometres. Joint surveys in both areas have been carried out as recent as 2013 and 2015, respectively.

While both China and Bhutan have stood their ground in all boundary talks with respect to Pasamlung and Jakarlung, Doklam has resulted because of differing perceptions of the tri-junction between the two and India. Differences have arisen because of Article 1 of the Calcutta Convention of 1890 signed between British India and the Qing Dynasty of China[2] which mentions Gipmochi or Gymochen near Dokala as being the tri-junction. India and Bhutan disagree with this and believe that because of the treaties and discussions that had followed the 1890 Convention, the tri-junction is opposite another Indian post called Batangla, which is the northern plateau of the Chumbi Valley.

India and China have already had a scuffle in Bhutan’s western flank in the area of Doklam or Dolam plateau in June 2017. China had begun extending an already existing road towards Doklam when they were stopped by Indian troops as it was against India’s security interests. Doklam lies in the southern portion of the Chumbi Valley, which points like a dagger towards India’s sensitive Siliguri Corridor. Chinese control over this southern plateau would mean widening of the Chumbi Valley threatening the corridor more effectively.

Besides Pasamlung, Jakarlung and Doklam, for the first time on 02 June 2020 China has now raised the issue of another disputed area with Bhutan, the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary, an area this time on the eastern border of Bhutan with India. In a meeting of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), China objected to a grant being given to the sanctuary in Trashigang district saying the area was disputed. The GEF is an independently functioning financial organisation that provides grants for environment related projects. There being no historical records that give even the faintest hint to form the basis of China’s claim over Sakteng, Bhutan has denied it and has been sanctioned the grant.

Sakteng covers an area of 650 square kilometres and is adjacent to Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh. The sanctuary is home to the Yeti or Migoi in Bhutanese and the area is inhabited by a 14^th century semi nomadic Tibetan tribe known as the Brokpas[3]. China’s claim to Sakteng is linked to Tawang and the rest of Arunachal Pradesh which it terms disputed. Tawang is the headquarters of Kameng district and was historically a part of Tibet with its world-famous monastery founded by the Fifth Dalai Lama. Since the Sixth Dalai Lama was born here, the Chinese feel it makes their case strong for claiming Tawang as being a part of Tibet. This is also the district where the Dalai Lama was received by India after he fled Lhasa in 1959. Tawang fell to the Chinese in the 1962 War but was given back to India when the war came to an end.

Sakteng would provide China the military advantage of being able to outflank the Indian defences at Tawang in a conflict. Its claim to the area therefore has to be viewed with suspicion as the motive could have a twist resulting in long term military consequences for India. Sakteng is eight to ten kilometres inside Bhutanese territory from the northern border with China and holds no logic to the Chinese claim. The June 2020 announcement of China claiming Sakteng has to be also seen in the context of India’s proposal to construct a road from Gauhati to Tawang via Trashigang district where the sanctuary is located. Besides providing an alternate route to Tawang, this road would reduce the distance by about 150 kilometers from the existing one which is via Bomdila and Se-la, speeding up mobilisation of Indian troops in case of a conflict with China.

Bhutan’s strategic importance for India can be gauged from the roles played by Doklam and Sakteng for its national security purposes. Both areas are the points of application of pressure on India by China for the Siliguri Corridor and Tawang, respectively. Claiming disputed areas in Bhutan would enable China an exchange that would give it control of the areas which are of interest to it. China is known to have offered a package deal to Bhutan where it is willing to surrender the disputed areas in the northern sector as well as a portion in the west in exchange for roughly 100 square kilometres in the area of Doklam[4]. This would be detrimental to Indian interests and efforts must be made by India to ramp up relations on all fronts with Bhutan with the required impetus.

The India-Bhutan Peace Treaty that came into effect from 02 March 2007 has bonded both countries in everlasting peace and friendship. Article 2 of the Treaty deals with cooperation by both countries on issues related to national interests[5]. The treaty also mentions that neither government will allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other. It was Article 2 of the Treaty that allowed India to intervene and stop the Chinese intrusion at Doklam in Bhutanese territory as it was against Indian security interests.

For guarding its sovereignty Bhutan relies on India for training and equipping its Army. India needs to crank up its defence relations with Bhutan in a manner that will allow extensive deployment of Indian troops on Bhutanese soil if a Chinese threat were to ever develop. An Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) is located in Thimpu that oversees the training of the Royal Bhutan Army. One infantry battalion visits Bhutan annually for a three-month joint training period. The period coincides with the fair-weather season to enable the passes on the Chinese border to be kept under surveillance by joint teams. Needless to say, plans should be and war-gamed to occupy Trashigang by Indian and Bhutanese troops in the event of a Chinese threat developing from that direction.

If China intrudes into Bhutanese territory the situation could get out of hand for India. Bhutan has a small Army meant primarily for ceremonial duties and guarding some important passes along its border with China. It does not have the capability to defend itself against a Chinese invasion. In the ongoing Ladakh faceoff, India has shown China that it has the capability to match up to it in every way. It has proved beyond doubt that it is no longer the same Army of 1962 and that the days of teaching India a lesson were over.

With India strongly holding all three sectors against China held and difficult to crack, of Mao’s five fingers, two, only Nepal and Bhutan still remain the weakest. Nepal is already cosying up to China and is on its way to becoming its vassal, while rumblings against Bhutan have started. India needs to work on its Neighbourhood First policy to effectively counter China’s influence among the neighbours. Under Article 2 of the India Bhutan Treaty of 2007, a commitment needs to be taken from Bhutan to allow a semi-permanent presence of Indian troops on their soil to tide over the problem posed by China. If Bhutan is subsumed by China it would throw open the road to India’s sensitive Siliguri Corridor, and the road to Bangladesh and beyond to the sea.

End Notes

[1] The Hindustan Times, 05 Jul 2020.

[2] Convention of Calcutta, Wikipedia.

[3] Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary – The Lost World, 13 July 2011.

[4] The Hindustan Times, 05 July 2020.

[5] India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty 2007, Ministry of External Affairs, 02 March 2007.

Lt Gen Shakti Gurung, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd), is the former Military Secretary of the Indian Army. During his 39 years of service he has extensive experience along the Western and Northern borders and counter terrorism / insurgency operations.
Article uploaded on 23-07-2020
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he belongs to or of the USI of India.