Kheda khaddour in a report for Carnegie Middle East Centre, on armed forces in Arab states and on the challenges of democratic transition, has argued that the Syrian army was not combat ready when the country’s current conflict erupted in spring 2011. Decades of corruption had stripped the Syrian Army of its combat and operational professional and yet five years on, it has withstood a mass public revolt, a multi front war and tens and thousands of defections.
In his report he has argued that Syrian Army is weak but resilient and that it has sustained itself by corruption. He correctly brings out that after Army’s last confrontation with Israel in 1982, it abandoned its primary task of fighting foreign enemies. Instead, the army turned to a more symbolic role that helped propagate the regime’s domestic narrative. The officers reaped power and resources in a way that increased corruption and reduced army’s fighting ability. He is of the opinion that army has sub contracted requirement of infantry for combat to para military forces and retained for itself monopoly of sophisticated and heavy weaponry. The Army has been successful in avoiding losses, mass defections and retaining control over qutaa – administration sectors assigned to each division. He opines that army’s paradoxical resilience has been essential for Assad regime’s survival.
While all of that which has been written in the report is true, yet there are few other factors which have contributed to the resilience of the army and its success in the recent past.
Firstly, majority of the Syrian military are Sunni but most of the military leadership is made up of Alawites, tribe to which Bashar al Assad himself belongs, who are 12% of the population but estimated to make up 70% of the soldiers. He has relied on a small core of trusted military units and hedged against defection by deploying only the most loyal from the Syrian army and who are entirely committed to survival of the regime. It is estimated that only one third of the army has been employed for combat.
Secondly, the short fall in generating combat power to prosecute troop-intensive counter insurgency campaign has been overcome by the para military or the militias. After Jan 1980 Baath Party congress, regime began to arm and train thousands of regime supporters throughout the country. These forces could be relied upon in the event of domestic turmoil and as a counter weight to the conventional army. This support was so central to the regime’s strategy that Hafez al-Assad was directly involved in their arming, training and employment. Many of the militia units draw their ranks from minority populations who have armed themselves to protect their towns and neighborhoods from anti – government fighters. In addition to the militias, the security apparatus has also successfully ensured compliance to orders by soldiers and that no major military unit defects with their leader.
Third factor contributing to the survival of the regime is the transition made by Assad from fighting insurgence to a civil war. He was on the losing side during counter insurgency campaign but after the transition to protracted civil war against Syria’s opposition in summer of 2012, he is now well positioned. The difference between the two could be described as one being a campaign to restore order & ensure its own reach throughout the geographical confines of the state against armed opponent who aim to overthrow the regime and in the other ie civil war controlling only the important territory. The distinction is practical than theoretical.
Fourth factor which needs highlighting is the role of about 30 foreign militia groups fighting essentially a sectarian conflict, with the Assad’s civilian militia groups, this also makes up for the shortfall in the numbers and capabilities of the Syrian Army.
The fifth and perhaps the most important factor is the support provided by Russia & Iran. Russia has been the principle source of training, material & credit for Syrian Armed Force. Russian Air Force has flown combat missions and provided intelligence. Russian intervention has kept the Assad regime going and has been a key factor in retaking of Palmyra from ISIS on 27 Mar 2016. The Iranian support has been more discreet but by no means less critical.
In conclusion it can be summarized that Kheda Khaddour has correctly argued that army’s paradoxical resilience has been essential for the Assad regime’s survival, but there are many other factors also which have ensured survival of the regime & recent military gains.