Idlib is a city in northwestern Syria, and has constantly been a centre of confrontation between opposing forces since the outbreak of civil war in 2011. The area is also the last major haven for foreign jihadists who came to Syria to fight the Alawite-led Assad government. A Russian-Backed offensive to retake Idlib, the last big rebel-held stronghold in Syria, seemed imminent only a few days ago, has been put on hold by Russia and Turkey, which back opposing sides in the war. On 17 September the two sides agreed to establish a buffer zone in Idlib that separates regime forces from their rebel adversaries. After striking a deal with Russia, Turkey will send more troops into the province. It already has soldiers at 12 locations in Idlib and supplies weapons to some of the rebels. To keep the peace, Turkish and Russian military police will patrol the nine to 12-mile wide strip. Rebel forces in the demilitarised zone will have to give up their heavy weapons by October 10th. The jihadists of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the most potent anti-government force in the province, which is linked to al-Qaeda, will also have to withdraw completely.
The Idlib region and adjoining territory north of Aleppo represent the opposition’s last big foothold in Syria, and the truce sets condition for a swathe of northern Syria to remain out of central government control for the time being. It may have assuaged the fears of an immediate widespread humanitarian catastrophe, as the UN officials were warning of the biggest humanitarian catastrophe of the century. However, the possibility of future trouble is not over yet. Much could go wrong. The deal’s success hinges on the withdrawal of HTS from the buffer zone. Should the group refuse Turkey’s efforts to persuade them, Russia would feel justified in backing a full-scale assault. The regime of President Bashar al-Assad may have little choice but to bow to the terms agreed by its Russian patron. But it has long said it wants to take back the entire country, and finally crush the revolt against its rule.
The deal also underscores the danger of leaving Syria’s fate in the hands of conflicting foreign powers. Hours after sealing the Idlib deal with Turkey, Israel carried out another strike on a Syrian military installation. The attack looked routine. Israel strikes on average once a week. This time, though, the target was unusually close to Russia’s main airbase, Khmeimim, on the Syrian coast. And when Syrian air-defence batteries responded with a salvo of missiles, they shot down a Russian spy-plane. Another underlining factor that has paved the way for the truce is the Russia’s “deconfliction” agreement with Israel. Israel will not interfere with Russia’s revival of the regime in Syria, and Russia will continue to allow Israel a more-or-less free rein to go after targets linked to Iran and its Lebanese proxy, Hizbullah. Nevertheless, Russia’s success in maintaining a balance between Israeli and Iranian interests since its intervention in Syria three years ago is increasingly under strain. The risk of mistakes or miscalculations that lead to further escalation are just a trigger-pull away.
Main article was published in The Economist on 18 September 2018.
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/09/18/russia-defers-one-crisis-in-syria-but-is-embroiled-in-another