In the last few months, there have been numerous diplomatic and military talks between China and India during the border tensions. This includes multiple rounds of colonel, brigadier and major general rank dialogue, special representatives’ meetings, meetings of the ‘Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on China-India Border Affairs’ (WMCC), meetings and communication between the foreign ministers and the defence ministers[2]. On 06 November, the eighth corps-commander-level meeting took place.[3]  However, complete disengagement and de-escalation between India and China appears to be a distant dream and both sides appear to be prepared to continue into the winter. With both China and India being nuclear states, and with Pakistani-Chinese nuclear links being no secret, there is a nuclear dimension to this triadic equation.

South Asia as the Nuclear Flash Point

For far too long has South Asia been termed as the nuclear “flash-point” with many western analysts predicting a dire situation with three nuclear armed neighbours and with a history of unresolved territorial disputes among them. To add to this volatile mixture has been Pakistan with its policy of state sponsored terrorism. No sooner a terrorist attack in India is traced back to Pakistan, it immediately launches into a tirade.  Various political leaders and even senior military commanders of Pakistan play the victim card and when confronted with irrefutable proof, they often indulge in nuclear sabre rattling to deter any punitive action by India. Surprisingly, this had not been taken note of till recently. Now, there appears to be more understanding on this and there appears to be no takers for Pakistan.[4]

Possible reasons for the non-use of threat of nuclear weapons

However, one issue that stands out clearly is that both China and India have not used the “nuclear” word at all and not once has there been a mention of the conflict escalating to use or even the threatened use of nuclear weapons.[5]  An important reason that explains this nuclear restraint and sobriety is the similarity in both the Indian and Chinese approach to nuclear weapons and deterrence.[6]

• Both have declared No First Use (NFU) positions.

• Both have been engaged in enhancing survivability of their nuclear arsenals to ensure assuredness of nuclear retaliation.

• Both countries understand the futility of the use of the weapon, unless it can be executed in such a way that disarms the other.

• Both are conscious of the implausibility of such a scenario.

• Neither sees its nuclear weapon as a war-fighting instrument to be flashed in crisis.

• For both, the role of the weapon is narrowly framed for safeguarding against nuclear blackmail and coercion.

Nuclear Stability in the Sino Indian Equation

Despite some doomsday predictions, alluding to the deployment of the INS Arihant and nuclear capable aircraft by India, the situation has not seen any developments on the nuclear front. Neither side has made any belligerent statements involving “threat” of use of nuclear weapons.  Unlike the high instability which is present in the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad; there is remarkable stability in the Sino-Indian dyad.

On China, it is apt to turn to the late K. Subrahmanyam who had observed years ago that irrespective of the state of relationship at any particular time; India and China will constitute mutual challenges for each other simply because of their civilizational heritage, global ambitions, and geographic contiguity[7]. Therefore, as he elaborated, India’s relationship with China ties into general deterrence and balance of power. China and India seek deterrent goals out of its nuclear capabilities whereas Pakistan seeks compelling benefits out of its nuclear capabilities.

A pattern of cautious strategic behavior has been exhibited consistently by both India and China. Both tend to exercise caution and avoid major escalatory actions such as intensifying the use of military instruments or expanding the theatre of operations.

Conclusion

Though much time has elapsed since their 1962 war and lethal clashes between them in 1967 and 1975, frictions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) dividing the two forces have increased in frequency and intensity over the past two decades.[8] India has pressed for a formal demarcation of the LAC, but China has been reluctant, apparently anticipating that an agreement might prejudice its case on the border dispute.

The history of nuclear dyads tells us that hostile nuclear powers invariably avoid major conventional war as well. As a matter of abundant caution, they try to stay on the “safe” side of two thresholds; those of nuclear and full-scale conventional war. What this implies is that in the modified paradox, varying forms of armed conflict short of major war may occur periodically, which is what one has witnessed in the context of Sino-India clashes.  However, in the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons are likely to remain in the shadows in the context of Sino-India relations and can be best summed up by quoting the former Indian national security adviser Mr. Shivshankar  Menon, “India-China nuclear deterrence is stable and will likely remain so despite shifts leading to equilibrium at higher technological levels as both programs develop increasing sophistication.”[9]

End Notes:

[1] Smriti Kak Ramachandran, “Soldiers exchanged after melee: Singh.” Hindustan Times, 21 June 2020.

[2]Mitra, Devirupa (6 June 2020). “Ahead of Border Talks With China, India Still Unclear of Reason Behind Troops Stand-Off”. The Wire, 06 June 2020.

[3] “Ladakh standoff: Eighth Corps Commander talks were candid, constructive, says India-China joint statement.” The Hindu, 08 November 2020.

[4] Vishnu Prakash, “Imran Khan’s Nuclear Sabre-rattling in Shadow of Kashmir Conflict Has No Takers.” Accessed at https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/opinion-imran-khans-nuclear-sabre-rattling-in-shadow-of-kashmir-conflict-has-no-takers-2294879.html

[5] Ramesh Thakur and  Manpreet Sethi, “India–China border dispute: the curious incident of a nuclear dog that didn’t bark.” Accessed at  https://thebulletin.org/2020/09/india-china-border-dispute-the-curious-incident-of-a-nuclear-dog-that-didnt-bark/

[6] Manpreet Sethi, “ Why India and China haven’t used the ‘N’ word throughout the Ladakh conflict.” The Print, 03 August 2020. Accessed at https://theprint.in/opinion/india-china-nuclear-doctrine-ladakh-conflict/473444/

[7] George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Nonproliferation (Berkeley, CA:

University of California Press, 1999)

[8] Rajesh Basrur, “ Geopolitical Tensions – China-India: The Stability-Instability Paradox.” RSIS, 23 June 2020.

[9] Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy (London: Random House UK, 2014, first published edition), 112.

Colonel GG Pamidi (Retd) is a former Senior Research Fellow at the United Service Institution of India (USI), New Delhi. Currently he is with the Indian Institute of Management, Indore.
Article uploaded on 18-12-2020.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he belongs to or of the USI of India.