Introduction
New Delhi’s relations with Kabul, particularly after the Soviet invasion of 1989, highlights the dedicated contribution of a friendly external power in the then Afghanistan’s fragile and unstable political and security infrastructure. Then New Delhi, extensively invested in instruments of soft power, particularly, the development of strategic and necessary technical infrastructure while limiting its participation in the security structure. In the late 1990s, India’s policy segments on Afghanistan was extensively linked with Russia and Iran, which resulted in strategic and regional cooperation. In the light of sheer differences then, they were principally backing the then United Front, of the then Northern Alliance in the fight against the Taliban. This cloaked New Delhi from a direct participation in the conflict.
India’s decision proved to be a smart choice then, particularly when different directly involved actors where already achieving India’s objectives. However, today, the scenario has changed dramatically. Approaches from Tehran and Moscow no longer align with India’s interest. Moscow’s pro-active interaction particularly with Afghan Taliban and Islamabad has made New Delhi apprehensive, raising doubts on Moscow’s deviation from its traditional approaches to Afghanistan. Today, Moscow and Tehran relentlessly challenge New Delhi’s policy of domestic progress and development solely under Afghan leadership.
New Delhi majorly depends on Washington for the Afghan domestic and external security. The USA trains the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to maintain peace and stability in the region, however, on the diplomatic front, Washington sees eye to eye with India on Islamabad’s notorious activities in Afghanistan, keeping check on the former’s activities. However, whether Washington is dependable is a different question altogether because even after handing considerable and substantial evidences to Washington’s security agencies about Pakistan’s support to the Taliban, its response has largely been passive.
The change in foreign policies of Tehran and Moscow highlights the need for New Delhi to aggressively assess and evaluate its policy on Afghanistan, in an effort to retain its progressive approach while re-assuring India’s commitment and dedication to Afghanistan in the light of the Taliban resurrection.
Afghanistan – Post ISAF and Taliban resurrection
Since its establishment in 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and NATO allies have repetitively failed to re-structure governing institutions in Afghanistan and completely eliminate Taliban presence. Supported by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, Taliban aggressively engaged in military confrontation with NATO led forces and continues to inflict serious wounds even today.
Post-ISAF Afghanistan, many significant aforementioned challenges continue to hamper Afghanistan’s rebuilding pace, however, the scenario in comparison to 1990s has drastically changed. Despite significant presence of Islamic fundamentalist militant factions, Afghanistan has become a battlefield of radical Wahhabi ideology which new politically motivated terror factions continues to use. TheTaliban leadership opened the doors for Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in early 1990s.
In the light of internal ideological rifts among terror factions, a new group of Islamic fundamentalists in the name of Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISKP) has emerged. A sub unit of ISIL, the task of the ISKP is to establish a Caliphate in Afghanistan. Although operating independently, the ISKP has distanced itself from Taliban, and has risen as a viable alternative to the latter.
The operational narrative of ISKP remains unclear, but its significant presence itself in Afghanistan has further rattled operational mechanism of many insurgent groups. Furthermore, the dissentions between complex Afghan multiple tribal communities remains which poses a grave threat to Kabul’s community development initiatives. Moreover, the surfacing of ISKP coupled with inter-departmental contentions, along with the challenges posed by returning Taliban reinforced with an unpredictable White House, points towards future unforeseen challenges for Afghanistan.
Policy makers must note that, the strategically inclined Afghanistan policy of Tehran and Moscow has changed adding further complexity to India’s Afghanistan policy. They have aligned with each other in an effort to diminish Washington’s influence on Afghanistan while establishing closeness with Afghan political leadership. Neither Moscow nor Tehran enjoy a healthy relationship with Washington. Moreover, the traditional decision-making mechanism has been diminished by the incumbent POTUS Donald Trump, whose reckless decision making mechanism has forced Washington back to square one, particularly in its relationship with Tehran. The smooth relationship enjoyed by both nations has now been replaced with contentions and accusations.
Moscow continues to maintain an estranged relationship with Washington, especially after its illegal military occupation intervention and occupation of Crimea and its relentless support to the Assad regime in the on-going civil war in Syria. Although, Moscow, from time to time expresses its concern on ISKP, but it has never opposed Islamabad’s intervention in Afghanistan. Since the ISKP and Taliban continue to stand against each other in an effort to dominate the Islamist militant in Afghanistan, Moscow’s relationship with Islamabad is significantly important, especially when they have insight and limited control on Taliban leaders. Also, Moscow’s intense relationship with Beijing, in the light of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), forces Moscow to extensively interact with Islamabad at various levels.
The Kabul based National Unity Government (NUG) is completely dependent on Washington for strategic, military and financial support. Washington’s growing distance from Tehran and Moscow, coupled with their closing up increase the complexity of Afghan politics. This is reducing the scope for an acceptable peace settlement.New Delhi, on the other hand, on numerous occasions, criticised the role of Pakistan and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) interference in Afghan domestic politics. Furthermore, it is impossible for New Delhi to employ covert tactics to contact Afghan Taliban, and it remains committed and dedicated in rebuilding Afghanistan.
New Delhi’s unprecedented commitments towards Afghanistan and dependence on Washington for security has put it in an odd position with Moscow and Tehran. Repetitive efforts taken by Indian security agencies and policy makers have largely failed to influence Moscow and Tehran even after highlighting that the actual problem lies in Islamabad. The military leadership in Kremlin believes that Washington is on the same lines of creating mujahedeen as in the early 1980s or Taliban in the late 1990s.
Tehran expresses contention on ISKP’s intense interaction with Saudi Arabia and Qatar and wants to remain one step ahead by influencing Afghan Taliban. Moreover, Moscow and Tehran see eye to eye in Syria which makes it difficult for both to part ways even after employing repetitive influencive measures by New Delhi. Even after highlighting the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), it will not be wrong to conclude that, on Afghanistan, New Delhi and its historical allies will not see eye to eye.
The Future for India
In the presence of multiple active yet diverse diplomacies induced by Moscow, Tehran and Washington, India retains its focus on re-building Afghanistan which, in the near future, might give New Delhi leverage on the discussion table, which New Delhi can use to distance Kabul from Islamabad.
However, there remains significant reluctance in New Delhi’s diplomacy which would hinder New Delhi from directly interacting with Afghan Taliban. In the light of Islamabad’s extensive influence in Kabul, not all violent non-state actors in Afghanistan have links with Islamabad, not all elements with Taliban share anti-Indian sentiments. Many elements do not endorse Pakistan’s instigation of insurgency in Kashmir. Today, Afghan Taliban is extensively over cautious in its operations which can label it as terrorism inclined, especially after having faced the past repercussions of Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war on the West.
New Delhi should remain committed and dedicated towards rebuilding Afghanistan. Strategically, this policy would ensure significant presence in Afghanistan without interfering in the already complex Afghan domestic politics. In an effort to end the conflict in Afghanistan, policy makers must look for answers within domestic Afghan politics. Reinforced by regional cooperation, New Delhi assistance to Kabul could help in overcoming 18 years of devastation, which might bring Afghanistan one step close towards peace.
@ Anant Mishra is a Researcher (Homeland Security & Anti-Terrorism) in The Institute of Forensic Sciences Gujarat.