2020 will be known for two defining events – COVID 19 and the Sino – Indian bloody duel that took place on the LAC on 16 Jun, where scores of soldiers were killed in rather unusual combat never seen before anywhere. Ironically, China’s handling of both these issues has been rather baffling and worrisome for its neighbours and others major powers. Debate has ensued on what prompted China to adopt such an aggressive behaviour when the world should be uniting to fight the biggest threats to mankind posed by the pandemic and economic recession. There are differing views, but many analysts have opined that increasing nationalism in China may have contributed to Xi adopting this strategy.

For India, it is a moment of reckoning and going forward it cannot be business as usual in her relations with China. PM Modi in his brief message on 17 Jun, at the beginning of meeting with CMs, very clearly stated that India will protect its sovereignty, he in fact said every stone and inch of ground will be defended; he also assured the nation that we have the capabilities to ensure it. He candidly stated that the responsibility for this situation lies squarely with China. Going by the media reports, the world has shown its solidarity with India’s position. Alice Wells, former top State Department official for South Asia, had said recently that China was seeking to upset the status quo with India and had to be “resisted.”[i]

This is the biggest crisis on the LAC after 1975. The killing of soldiers on both sides on 16 Jun are the first combat fatalities on the mountainous border between India and China in 45 years, drawing to a close an era in which Asia’s two largest powers had managed their differences without bloodshed.  The tensions on the LAC have been building up at least for past decade or so, in spite of many agreements existing to maintain Peace and Tranquillity (beginning with pathbreaking agreement in 1993 and then in 1996, 2005, 2012 and 2013). Interestingly, PM Modi has met President Xi 18 times in past seven years[ii], but the border has continued to turn stormier, with Chinese incursions in Ladakh occurring in 2013 and 2014, and a 73-day stand-off at Doklam in 2017.  However, past spats cooled down after withdrawals and rounds of hurried diplomacy between New Delhi and Beijing.

In what is a departure from the past, the Indian and Chinese armies have been locked in a stand-off simultaneously at three sites in Ladakh, for over a month. In April, PLA reportedly broke off from exercises and occupied disputed territory along the LAC. Both sides also quickly moved troops and heavy weapons towards the LAC in the wake of fist fights in May, at Pangong Tso in Ladakh, and at Naku La in Sikkim. Beginning with meeting of senior military commanders on 6 Jun and Joint Secretary level talks, an agreement was reached to de-escalate the situation.

On 9 June, Indian government said China had pulled back troops, tents, and vehicles at the Galwan valley and another site (though not the lake), and that India had reciprocated. On 13 June, General M.M. Naravane, Army Chief declared that talks had been “very fruitful”[iii].

The deadly clash three days later suggests they were clearly not fruitful enough. Reports suggest that the troops had been meeting to discuss the details of a withdrawal when a fight broke out, killing a Col and two soldiers. “The Chinese seem to have brought iron rods, sticks studded with metal tips and stones,” says Nitin Gokhale siting his sources. The reinforcements from both the sides rushed and blood bath ensued until midnight. Fatalities of soldiers on both sides have been large; for the PLA, these would be first fatalities in combat, outside of peacekeeping, since skirmishes with Vietnam in the 1980s.

India has released the names of the martyrs and the last rites of the soldiers are drawing huge public participation. On the contrary, Chinese media has played down the death of its soldiers. It seems unlikely that China will even release the names of the dead. Deaths could also be read as a sign of weakness, especially when the Chinese side really did come off worse.

Early morning on 17 Jun, Maj Gens from both sides met at the behest of PLA to defuse the situation. However, China’s government has continued to be unrepentant. It said that India had gone back on earlier agreements and “twice crossed the border line for illegal activities and provoked and attacked Chinese personnel”.  The situation continues to be grim between the nuclear power neighbours.

What triggered Chinese Aggression?  Mr Shiv Shankar Menon in an interview to Karan Thapar attributed the Chinese aggressiveness to both internal and external factors.

It is worth recalling an incident on the Soviet border in 1960s, where fighting along the Ussuri River saw similar numbers of dead, but tensions escalated far higher than with India, leading to fears of a full-blown war and a possible nuclear exchange that were only alleviated by the highest-level diplomacy. In part, those clashes were driven by political needs on the Chinese side; officers and soldiers alike felt the need to demonstrate their Maoist enthusiasm, leading to such actions as swimming across the river waving Mao Zedong’s Little Red Book[iv].

The coronavirus has produced heightened political uncertainty in China, leading to a newly aggressive form of “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy—Chinese officials are under considerable pressure to be performatively nationalist; moderation and restraint are becoming increasingly dangerous for careers.

As far as the external factors are concerned, the immediate cause of the current crisis seems to have been India’s build-up of infrastructure in Eastern Ladakh, including a key north-south road, making it easier to move troops and redressing China’s advantage in logistics. India has dramatically improved its ability to bring in emergency reinforcements in the event of a skirmish. India has also been enhancing other capabilities to bolster its military strategy of building ‘Deterrence’ along its Northern Borders. What is being witnessed now is the friction of both sides adjusting to a more capable and more resolved Indian approach to the LAC.

India has been concerned over China’s growing economic and political clout in its immediate neighbourhood— Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. China identifies security in the IOR as a primary concern for her “core interests”. Both countries are seeking to strengthen ties with smaller regional states to secure their respective security and economic interests adding to the strategic competition. China feels it must contain Indian influence in South Asia and IOR, where India has a major geographical advantage, to achieve its goal of being the sole leading power in Asia.

In response, successive Indian governments have tilted closer to USA (with whom India signed a $3.5bn arms deal in February this year), and China’s neighbours in Asia, such as Vietnam and Indonesia. A quartet of China-sceptic countries known as the “Quad”, comprising USA, Australia, India, and Japan, now meet regularly. Though India stressed that the Quad is not an alliance, Australia may soon join naval exercises involving the other three countries, lending a naval dimension to the group. These actions of India are being seen by Xi as part of a strategy to contain China.

Settlement of border dispute will pose fresh challenges. China resolved its border disputes with Russia and other Soviet successor states in the 1990s and 2000s through a serious diplomatic push on both sides and mass exchanges of territory. But although the area involved was much larger, the Himalayan territorial disputes are much more sensitive and harder to resolve. There is also a perceptible strategic mistrust between the two countries which will be further exacerbated by recent events.

A border settlement will involve mutual adjustments in the spirit of give and take, therefore, this seems very unlikely at least in the foreseeable future. Moreover, China wants to use unsettled borders with India as a pressure point to influence India’s strategic choices. However, both sides do recognise the dangers of heightened tensions on the borders and its negative geo-strategic and geo-economic fallouts. It is unlikely that the situation on the LAC will result in an all-out conflict. Ultimately, India and China will have to work out fresh mechanism to maintain peace and tranquillity on the LAC.

This week’s events mark a major inflection point. MEA statement on 17 Jun stated that” External Affairs Minister and the State Councillor and Foreign Minister of China, H.E. Mr. Wang Yi, had a phone conversation this afternoon on recent developments in Ladakh.   EAM underlined that this unprecedented development will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship. The need of the hour was for the Chinese side to reassess its actions and take corrective steps”[v].

Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal has said that “India should stand firm militarily on the border and at the same time expand political options against China. We open our political options against China in areas where their interests would be as deeply hurt as they hurt ours through actions such as raising the Kashmir issue in the UNSC and opposing our membership of the NSG. These options are with regard to Dalai Lama, Tibet, Taiwan and Hong Kong.” [vi]

There are many leverages which India can exercise against China. To begin with, India must begin economic and technological engagements with Taiwan, besides supporting it politically. Statements on China’s atrocities in Xinjiang, according prominence to Dali Lama in various forums and measures to reduce the trade deficit are few others. However, these leverages should be exercised based on the Chinese behaviour in the future.

Opinions in India seem to be veering around the fact that Pax-Sinica which China is aspiring to achieve, is not in India’s long-term interest and that India has to make strategic choices sooner rather than later. “Sino-Indian relations can never go back to the old normal,” said Ashley Tellis, of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “They will reset with greater competitiveness and in ways that neither country had actually intended at the beginning of the crisis.”[vii]

End Notes

[i] https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2020/06/17/India-China-At-least-20-Indian-soldiers-killed-US-hopes-for-peaceful-resolution

[ii] https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-china-standoff-diplomacy-lac-incident-mea-6462195

[iii] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/situation-on-borders-with-china-under-control-army-chief/articleshow/76353564.cms

[iv] https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/16/why-are-india-china-fighting-ladakh-skirmish/

[v] https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32765/Phone call between External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and Foreign Minister of China  HE Mr Wang Yi

[vi] Indian Express, Thursday, June18,2020,New Delhi, late city.

[vii] https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/in-depth/india-china-border-standoff-may-escalate-into-an-armed-conflict-top-strategic-expert-ashley-tellis/ar-BB14InDB

Maj Gen RPS Bhadauria, VSM (Retd) is a Distinguished Fellow with the USI of India. He has served extensively along India’s Northern Borders and is an expert in conducting scenario gaming. He has conducted these scenario gaming exercises at premier Military Institutions, for MEA at the Sushma Swaraj Institute of Foreign service, Police Academy Hyderabad, for IAS at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy for Administration, and for National Intelligence Agency (a multi-national exercise for QUAD).

Article uploaded on 18-06-2020
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he belongs to or of the USI of India.