Major General Harsha Kakar (Retd) Writes :
Introduction
On 15th Aug 2019, the Prime Minister in his annual Red Fort address to the nation announced a major decision: India would have a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Reforms which were overdue for decades became a reality. In end December 2019, General Bipin Rawat, who was retiring as the army chief was appointed as the first CDS. As part of his charter he was reportedly given a period of three years to create integrated commands.[i]
National Security Threats
Threats for which our military must be organised, primarily arise from China and Pakistan. In the future, China will continue to assert itself, seeking to establish dominance in states surrounding India and in the Indian Ocean. Due to existing topography, the PLA possesses the advantage of interior lines of communication. Operations if launched by Pakistan, would initially be non-linear and hybrid, while seeking to employ proxy forces in depth areas operating in conjunction with military forces, all under a nuclear umbrella. The availability of nuclear weapons is aimed at restricting employment of strong conventional Indian forces operating in depth for prolonged periods.
Maritime requirements include ensuring protection of Sea Lines of Communications, supporting Indian Ocean Region states, controlling crime and maintaining a friendly littoral. This implies ensuring supremacy in surface and sub-surface marine operations. Emphasis will shift to sea denial. Our island territories and offshore assets also need monitoring and protection.
In the aerospace domain, existing threats would increase with growing capabilities of our adversaries, especially with enhanced concentration on employment of long-range missiles with greater accuracy and larger standoff ranges of weapons. Demands on airpower would be intense as would be the requirement of ensuring air defence security to the nation and its strategic assets.
Shortcomings Within Our Current Force Structuring
The prime shortcoming is that each service views its strategic and operational role in isolation. This has led to lack of synergy in operations. Planning, procurement and processing of capabilities is only a compilation of individual service requirements not based on a common threat profile. Individual service logistics chains imply duplicity in demanding, repairing, warehousing and transportation.
Shortcoming in the current structure also impact force application. Inter-service coordination is only possible at Service HQ level. Current sectoral area of responsibility makes force application predictable. The air force representatives at army command and corps level are responsible to their own service chain of command, rather than the army. This implies differing operational priorities.
Chinese Theatre Commands
The Chinese have created five geographical commands. The reason for China adopting the theatre command model is to develop an integrated joint operations capability, promote joint training and enhance familiarity between Services while providing for a rapid transition from peace to war.
The Chinese Western Theatre Command is responsible for operations against India. It has integral to it adequate force levels including special and airborne forces needed for operations against India. However naval operations against India do not fall within the responsibility of this command and would need coordination with its Southern Theatre Command. This Command while primarily focussed to the South China sea is also responsible for the borders with Myanmar and Vietnam and for naval operations in the Indian Ocean.
Establishing Theatre Commands
The study for establishing an Air Defence (AD) Command is underway[ii] and that for establishing a Peninsula Command likely to be ordered shortly. The AD command envisages amalgamating all air defence resources of the three services except those required in the tactical battle area. The Peninsula command involves placing all resources of Western and Eastern Naval Command, few air force resources currently based in South India and some army formations/units into a single integrated command under the navy.
Studies to establish land-based theatre commands are only likely to commence by the end of the year. For other functional commands, including an integrated logistics command, Information Warfare and Psychological Operations Command and integrated training command, no firm schedule has yet been announced. The Andaman and Nicobar Command, Strategic Forces Command, Cyber Agency, Defence Space Agency and Armed Forces Special Operations Division, would remain in their present form.
Options for Creating Land-based Theatre Commands
Integrated land-based commands could either be threat oriented or geographical or a mix of both. When considering them from the geographical option, India could have two commands, Northern, against China and Western, for Pakistan. In the threat- based option, J and K, which remains a major threat from both Pakistan and China, could remain a separate command, while the other two could be re-termed as Eastern, looking towards China and Western towards Pakistan.
Geographical Commands (Fig 1).
The Western Theatre Command (Bi-service) would stretch from Siachen to the Rann of Kutch. It would also be responsible for counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir. The Northern Theatre Command (Bi-service) would be responsible for the border from Ladakh to Arunachal. It would also be responsible for insurgency in the North East. Thus, India could be divided into two integrated theatre commands.
The option implies, one threat, one nation and for which one command is responsible. It would lead to coordinated operations, depending on the nature of threat. It would make planning, deployment and synchronisation of operations easy. Each command has multiple roles including insurgency. In J and K, where a collusive threat from both Pakistan and China exists, coordinated operations and sharing of resources may prove difficult.
Fig 1: Integrated Theatre Command: Geographical Approach
Threat-based Theatre Commands (Fig 2).
In this case the broad sanctity of existing Northern and Eastern Commands would be maintained. The major change would be that the Northern Command would be responsible for complete J and K upto its border with Punjab as also Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh Sector of the current Western Command. The balance border with China would be with Eastern Command. The Western Command would handle the plains, semi-desert and desert sectors, implying regions currently under the Western, South Western and Southern Commands.
There is an option of creating an additional integrated command (Integrated Central Command) to handle the Indo-Tibet border extending from Himachal, Uttarakhand to Sikkim including the responsibility of Chicken’s Neck. It implies handling disjointed sectors on both sides of Nepal. However, considering that the current responsibility of Eastern Command includes Sikkim, creating an additional command for two disjointed sectors is impractical. It would also lead to three commands facing China, implying lack of coordination in operations.
Fig 2: Integrated Theatre Command: Threat Based Approach
Advantages/Disadvantages of this option. Sanctity of two crucial commands is maintained. Importance of J and K as a flashpoint is catered for and the region is considered as a separate theatre of war. All offensive and defensive corps are under one commander, providing him multiple options. Airpower in J and K can be effectively employed. The major disadvantage is that there would be no synchronization of operations against China as the Ladakh and North East sectors are under different commands.
Theatre Command Structures
Considering the need for maintaining stability in operations, it is opined that once theatre commands are established and take over their responsibility, current Command HQs could be closed and Corps HQs function directly under them. This will also result in minimum destabilization. Hence, the following is recommended:
Geographical Command Structures. The Western theatre command could be built up on the existing Western command. Current operational commands at Udhampur, Jaipur and Pune continue as hither to fore. No change in functioning of Corps HQs and below. Existing Northern Command to be less the Leh Corps which would sidestep to the newly created Northern theatre command, which could be located on the premises of the current Central Command at Lucknow. The Leh Corps would also be responsible for the Himachal Pradesh Sector, the Command and Control for Uttarakhand sector can continue as at present. Eastern Command would continue in its present location. Once theatre commands are raised and functional, existing operational commands could wind up and Corps operate directly under theatre commands.
Threat Based Theatre Commands. In this case, Northern and Eastern Commands continue as at present, with added responsibility of Himachal Pradesh Sector to Northern and Uttarakhand to Eastern. The newly raised Western theatre command is located at Lucknow, while existing operational commands at Chandimandir, Jaipur and Pune remain in place till the theatre command stabilizes. These are subsequently disbanded.
Recommended Option.
The threat-based option is recommended. This would imply that while the Northern and Eastern Command remain as at current, the others close when theatre commands are operational. Corps HQs and below should remain in place. In addition, two functional commands, not yet under consideration need to be created. These are Integrated Logistics Command and Integrated Training Command. In the context of integrated theatre commands, IAF staff collocated with the army would continue, however they would function under the integrated theatre commander and not the air force chain of command. Resources already allocated to the theatre command would be their responsibility as also coordinating additional resources from any functional air force command which may be created.
Conclusion
There is no escaping the fact that integrated theatre commands will be established. Simultaneously, Indian conditions and requirements for theatre commands are at variance from other countries and hence require a unique solution. Resources, especially airpower would always remain at a premium. Hence, India would need to move with caution and not make rushed judgements leading to subsequent changes. Sequential movement incorporating hygiene factors, joint logistics and joint training would make the transition smoother.
End note
[i] ‘Looking to create air defence, logistics and peninsula theatre commands’: CDS Gen Bipin Rawat’, The Hindustan Times, Feb 04, 2020. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/looking-to-create-air-defence-logistics-and-peninsula-theatre-commands-cds-gen-bipin-rawat/story-SO6Jnab4HVn3NMdstGooDO.html
[ii] Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, “CDS Bipin Rawat focuses on preparing roadmap for creation of an air defence command”, Economic Times, Jan 02, 2020. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/cds-deadline-for-proposal-to-create-air-defence-command/articleshow/73072858.cms?from=mdr
Major General Harsha Kakar (Retd) writes and speaks on national security and the armed forces. Commissioned into the Regiment of Artillery in Jun 1979 he has held a number of appointments in field and peace. He was the head of department of strategic studies at the College of Defence Management. He was the first Indian army officer to attend the National Security Studies Course at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he belongs to or of the USI of India.